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HOW MUCH IS TOO MUCH? THE LIMITS TO GENEROUS TREATMENT
OF STAKEHOLDERS

ABSTRACT
Firms must allocate some minimum amount of value to stakeholders in order to

retain access to the resources they provide. Stakeholder theory suggests managers

optimize firm-level performance by allocating more than this minimum amount. But how

much is too much? This article addresses the misleading notion that more is always better
when it comes to the treatment of stakeholders and, in doing so, provides a needed

refinement of the boundary of stakeholder theory’s predictions. The upside for managers

is guidance in distinguishing between the types of value-allocating behaviors that will lead
to greater value creation in their firms and actions that are likely to reduce value overall.
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MANAGING FOR STAKEHOLDERS IS NOT FREE
When Malden Mill’s Massachusetts factory burnt down, CEO Aaron Feuerstein not

only decided to rebuild it in its comparatively expensive location, but he also continued
paying his inactive workers’ salaries for three months. Malden’s focus on employees is

reflected by Feuerstein’s own statement that the “company will be true to its mission of
responsibility to the workers, as opposed to other interests (Moreno, 2003: 92).” His

benevolence made him a corporate hero, and it was not unusual for his adoring employees
to lavish him with praise, sometimes even kneeling and kissing his hand. Malden’s

generosity also extended to the surrounding community through contributions to homeless
shelters and neighborhood revitalization projects.

As Malden Mills ran into financial difficulties stemming from the debts the company

incurred after the fire, the Boston Globe called on the public to continue buying its

signature product Polartec. Nevertheless, local public support was not enough the save the
company from bankruptcy. Creditors removed Feurstein as CEO and worked out a plan

with the courts to save the company. However, additional financial problems led to another
bankruptcy and abandonment of the Malden Mills pension plan that covered over a

thousand employees. Feuerstein, in spite of good intentions and a very popular product,
had set the company up for failure.

The Malden Mills case seems counter to the logic of stakeholder theory, which

suggests that firms can achieve high levels of competitiveness and create more value if they
treat their stakeholders generously, a management approach that might be called

“managing for stakeholders” (Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007). In fact, a substantial

amount of research supports this idea (see review in Freeman, et al., 2010). In one study,
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researchers used an arduous process to select 30 firms exemplary of broad stakeholderbased management (Sisodia, Wolfe, & Sheth, 2007). Examples of the firms on their list

include Trader Joe’s, Honda, IKEA and Harley-Davidson. These companies outperformed

the S&P 500 by significant margins over both short- and long-term time frames. Another
research team examined the financial effect of a firm’s relations with its primary

nonfinancial stakeholders, including customers, employees, communities, and the

environment (Choi & Wang, 2009). Their study of 518 firms over a period of 11 years

suggests not only that good stakeholder relations help firms sustain superior performance,
but that they also help poorly performing firms recover more quickly from
disadvantageous positions.

How can we understand what happened at Malden Mills in the face of all the

research that supports the efficacy of a stakeholder-based management approach? Clearly
there are benefits to munificent treatment of stakeholders, but there are also substantial
costs. Malden Mills enjoyed tremendous support and loyalty from employees and its

community, but the costs associated with creating that support and loyalty were so high
that they could not be offset by the associated benefits. The only way managing for

stakeholders works, from an economic perspective, is if the benefits exceed the additional
costs.

Still, establishing boundaries with regard to how much value to allocate to

stakeholders is an open question. While stakeholder theory promotes better treatment of a
broad group of stakeholders, it does not set limits with regard to this behavior. One of the
factors that can stand in the way of a successful stakeholder-based strategy is that firms

allocate too much value to one or several stakeholders, which amounts to “giving away the
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store.” Clearly, firms must allocate some minimum amount of value to stakeholders in

order to retain access to the resources they provide. Managing for stakeholders involves
allocating more than this minimum amount. But how much is too much?

This article addresses the misleading notion that more is always better when it

comes to the generous treatment of stakeholders and, therefore, will help to remedy a

common criticism and misunderstanding of stakeholder theory. We begin this paper by

reviewing the basic arguments associated with managing for stakeholders and how firms

receive returns from being generous with the value they allocate to them. We then build on
this foundation to provide guidelines for helping to determine when a firm may be

allocating too much (or too little) value to stakeholders. We follow with a discussion of
implications for managers and scholars.

ALLOCATIONS OF VALUE AND STAKEHOLDER RESPONSES

Managers have responsibility for both fostering the creation of and distributing

value to stakeholders through the activities of the firm. Stakeholders that are most closely
associated with the firm’s value creation activities include employees and managers,
customers, suppliers (including suppliers of capital), communities and the firm’s

owners/shareholders. We will call these primary stakeholders. Coff (1999) suggests that

firms need to allocate at least enough value to their stakeholders so that they will continue
to do business with them. But one of the core principles of stakeholder theory is that firms
should go above this minimum value and furthermore, that doing so provides benefits,

including economic benefits, that exceed the additional costs (Freeman, 1984; Freeman,
Harrison, & Wicks, 2007).
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Benefits to Firms from Allocating Additional Value to Stakeholders
One of the most widely cited reasons for the success of firms that manage for

stakeholders is that they efficiently attract and retain stakeholders (Barringer & Harrison,
2000; Freeman, et al., 2007). Firms that manage for stakeholders treat their stakeholders
well, are trustworthy, and tend to be more socially conscious (because it is important to

some stakeholders). Because of these characteristics, resource-providing stakeholders such

as customers, suppliers and financiers are drawn to them, thus providing a competitive

advantage. For example, in the natural food retailing industry, Whole Foods enjoys a stellar
reputation for treating its stakeholders well, and this reputation has attracted many
suppliers, customers and other stakeholders to the company.

Affiliation with certain organizations can also provide stakeholders with feelings of

esteem, connectedness and empowerment (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Investing energy in or
doing business with an organization that exhibits behaviors that are consistent with their

own values helps stakeholders develop a sense that they own a portion of the company and
its purposes (Vanderwalle, Van Dyne, & Kostova, 1995). These types of factors are non-

monetary, but also critical to understanding the way stakeholders behave. In the case of

Whole Foods, employees, suppliers and customers feel good about their associations with

the company. They feel as though they “own” a piece of what the company does. Programs
such as their 5-Step Animal Welfare Rating System and buying from local suppliers
reinforce those feelings.

Reciprocity, the mutual reinforcement by two or more stakeholders of each other’s

actions, provides an important link in the relationship between the value a firm distributes
and the amount it creates (i.e., Becker, 1986; Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). The link is
6

established on the recognition that economic actors’ behaviors are triggered primarily by

their perceptions of fairness (Blau, 1964). Game theory supports the notion of reciprocity.
For example, in the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma game, researchers have documented
that the best strategy is to cooperate during the first round of play and then imitate

(reciprocate) the opponent’s move for every successive round (Axelrod, 1980). Game

theory has also demonstrated that actors’ perceptions of fairness are influenced by the
material outcomes they receive (Nelson, 2001; Rabin, 1993).

People reciprocate to the way they are treated by returning similar treatment.

Trustworthiness leads to more trustworthiness. Sharing of valuable information

encourages sharing of valuable information. Generosity leads to a return of generosity. If a

stakeholder believes that a firm is providing more value than it is obligated to provide then
they will likely reciprocate. For employees this could mean working harder or sharing

valuable information with the employer, for customers this breeds loyalty and increases

demand, for suppliers (including suppliers of financial capital) it could mean better terms,
or for communities it could mean greater support for expansion projects.

Positive reciprocity occurs when a firm provides a stakeholder with greater total

value than expected and the stakeholder responds by putting forth greater effort on behalf
of the firm. All else equal, a firm that generates a cycle of positive reciprocity among its

stakeholders should create more value and enjoy higher performance than a rival firm that
does not (Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison, 2009). Such a firm is then in a stronger position to
allocate more value back to the stakeholders that helped to create it. Whole Foods’

Stakeholder Philosophy reflects this perspective: “Our ‘bottom line’ ultimately depends on
our ability to satisfy all of our stakeholders. Our goal is to balance the needs and desires of
7

our customers, Team Members, shareholders, suppliers, communities and the environment
while creating value for all. By growing the collective pie, we create larger slices for all of
our stakeholders (Whole Foods Market, 2011: 2).”

The norm of reciprocity also works the other way, however (Larson, 1992). When

stakeholders perceive they receive less value than they should they negatively reciprocate
towards the firm. Negative reciprocity can destroy value as stakeholders put forth below-

normal effort, and they may also behave in ways that actually increase costs for the firm
such as sabotage, deception, legal suits, or boycotts.

The Costs of Stimulating Reciprocity Among Stakeholders
As mentioned previously, activities that are likely to foster positive reciprocity

among a firm’s stakeholders are associated with additional costs. In essence, the firm must
allocate more value to obtain more value. One way value is allocated is through the

material or financial benefits stakeholders receive from the firm. For example, customers
receive value from the firm in terms of the quality and functionality of the products and

services of the firm, as well as the services they receive after the sale. Employees receive
material compensation through wages and benefits, perquisites, bonuses, profit sharing
and so forth. Suppliers receive material compensation and other benefits for what they

provide to the firm. Research suggests that full cooperation of stakeholders is only possible

when they perceive that what they receive from the firm is fair relative to what members of

their referent group receive (i.e., Adams, 1965). We will explore this idea further in the next
section.

Firms also allocate value to stakeholders in other ways that are not as easily

measured in dollars and cents, such as the fairness of a firm’s decision-making processes
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(Phillips, 2003). Processes that are perceived as fair by stakeholders add costs due to the

increased time and attention managers pay to stakeholders, increased communications and
information processing costs, and the additional amount of time it takes the firm to make

decisions when more stakeholder input is considered. In addition, a firm that is sensitive to
stakeholder interests may expend resources to support activities that have high appeal to

certain stakeholders but do not directly add to their economic welfare. For example, Whole
Foods supports a micro-financing program that helps poor people start businesses in

developing countries. This program appeals to many of the company’s stakeholders and
provides non-monetary value in terms of esteem from affiliation and a feeling of
ownership, but it also adds costs.

Whole Foods’ successes stand in stark contrast to Malden Mills’ failures, yet the

driving forces appear to be similar in both organizations and there is evidence of

stakeholder reciprocity in both cases. The key difference is in the amount of value allocated
to stakeholders. We observe what might be considered an irresponsible amount of value

allocated to stakeholders in the case of Malden Mills (at least in hindsight), whereas Whole
Foods seems to have a healthy balance of value received from stakeholders to value

allocated to them. So how can a firm determine how much value is too much (or too little)
to allocate to stakeholders?

EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF VALUE TO STAKEHOLDERS

Stakeholder theory has a strong moral foundation. That is, it advocates for virtuous

treatment of stakeholders because it is the morally correct thing to do (Freeman, et al.,

2010). While we acknowledge this reasoning, our approach is much more practical. It is
efficiency based in that we are examining the allocation of value to stakeholders on the
9

basis of what makes sense from an economic perspective. At the same time, the practical
foundation upon which we are building assumes that organizations should respect all of

their stakeholders through treating them with dignity, honesty, and courtesy (Cropanzano,

Bowen, & Guilliland, 2007; Phillips, 2003). This sort of treatment is a prerequisite for trust,
and trust enables reciprocity. A stakeholder is unlikely to expend additional effort on

behalf of, feel strong affiliation with, or exhibit a high level of loyalty to an untrustworthy
organization. Since treating stakeholders with dignity, honesty and courtesy is not

particularly expensive, generous applications of this type of treatment are unlikely to upset
the marginal cost/benefit balance in a negative fashion.
Too Little Value Allocated to Stakeholders

It is necessary to establish a concept of what the lower bound of value allocated to a

stakeholder might be so that we can discuss what exceeds it. A practical base level of value
is the stakeholder’s opportunity cost. As a simplified example, assume that an employee is
receiving a particular level of value from working for a firm in the form of salary and

benefits and a feeling that the employer is fair in its decisions and adequately considers the
welfare of employees. For that employee to feel motivated to leave the employer, she or he
would have to locate another employer (or form of employment) with expectations of

receiving enough additional value to compensate for the value currently received (and the
cost of the switch). Even if the employee stays with the employer, the opportunity cost is

highly relevant. If the employee believes that she or he is receiving total value that is higher
than her or his opportunity cost, then positive reciprocity can influence their behavior. In
addition to feeling loyal, the employee is more likely to expend additional energy, share
important information, and work to enhance the welfare of the employer.
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This sort of analysis applies to all of the primary stakeholders that interact with the

firm. The nature of their relationship with the firm and thus the behavior they exhibit is
dependent on the extent to which the firm offers them an attractive value proposition

relative to other opportunities that are available to them; the value proposition includes
both tangible and intangible factors. For instance, two firms might offer customers

essentially similar products so they choose the firm that treats them better or that exhibits
socially responsive behavior in areas they consider important. When any stakeholder

receives value that is above their opportunity cost they tend to reciprocate with behaviors
that help the firm to create more value within its total system of value creation, and this
additional value can then be dispersed among stakeholders, thus continuing a positive
cycle.

Too Much Value Allocated to Stakeholders
At the opposite extreme is a philosophy of giving highest priority to stakeholders’

short-term welfare by allocating excessive value to them. This can generate extraordinarily
high costs for the firm that can actually damage its longer-term competitiveness, as in the
case of Malden Mills. Table 1 contains examples of three other firms that hurt their own
competitiveness by allocating too much value to particular stakeholders, thus leaving
insufficient value for other stakeholders and for investments in future value-creating
activities such as research and development or purchases of new technology.
[insert Table 1 about here]

By virtue of its apparent failure to set limits on a firm’s favorable treatment of

stakeholders, stakeholder theory seems to promote a position in which firms may “give
away the store” in the sense of spending so many resources in satisfying the needs and
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wants of particular stakeholders, such as employees, communities or society as a whole,
that they sacrifice profitability. Shareholder advocates have taken advantage of this

vulnerability in the theory and suggested that any allocations of value to stakeholders

beyond what is necessary to retain their participation is wasteful and that managers who

do so are acting irresponsibly with regard to protecting shareholder interests (i.e., Jensen,
2002).

A firm allocates too much material value to a stakeholder when the marginal unit of

value received by the stakeholder results in less than a unit of new value created through
reciprocity on the part of stakeholders. This is difficult to determine precisely on a

stakeholder-by-stakeholder basis, but there are broader signals that too much value has
been distributed. One signal is when there is not enough material value for other

stakeholders to maintain their willful participation in the firm. For example, this may

happen when a firm gives high priority to shareholder allocations such as dividends or
share buyback programs at a time when employees are receiving compensation below

what is found in other firms in their markets and industries. In this example the firm is

allocating too much value to one stakeholder group at the expense of another stakeholder

group; the expected result is ultimately value destruction as a result of negative reciprocity
from the employees (Akerlof, 1982). Another signal is when the firm’s resources are being
depleted at a level at which it is difficult to sustain a healthy production cycle in the firm,
which includes pre-production activities such as research and development, core

production activities and post-production activities such as marketing, distribution and
service.
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In terms of a firm’s decision-making processes, too much stakeholder involvement

occurs when the decision process becomes too complex to manage effectively – process

inefficiency threatens productivity. When a firm is providing too much voice, participation
and influence to stakeholders, decision quality is not marginally improved by each

successive bit of stakeholder influence or information. Perhaps this is due to a particular

stakeholder being given too much input to the decision or it could be that the firm is going

too far in terms of giving voice to every conceivable stakeholder or in trying to consider too
many stakeholder needs or perspectives in its decision-making processes. Inefficiency may
also occur because collecting information from a broad group of stakeholders can uncover

previously undiscovered conflicts of interest that then have to be resolved. Table 2 contains
a description of the lower and upper boundaries of value allocations to stakeholders, as
well as the optimal position from an efficiency perspective.

[insert Table 2 about here]

Value Creating Allocations of Value to Stakeholders

Managers face a difficult challenge trying to stimulate positive reciprocity towards

the firm without diluting the value created by the firm. The concept of a ‘just noticeable

difference’ can help a firm determine how to allocate material value back to stakeholders.
This concept was developed in the organizational psychology literature and has been

applied to a variety of human resource issues (Zedeck & Smith, 1968). A simple explanation
is that for an improvement in an employee’s situation (i.e., a raise) to make a positive
difference in the way they respond to the organization it must be enough of an

improvement for the employee to notice. Otherwise the effort is wasted. The just noticeable
difference has also been applied to marketing, where the question is how much a product
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must be improved before customers will select it over a competing product (Britt & Nelson,
1976). We are applying the term here a little differently than it has been used previously. A
just noticeable difference means that the value a firm offers to a stakeholder is noticeably
recognized and appreciated by the stakeholder as being better than value propositions
offered by firms that compete for what they offer to the firm.
Each stakeholder is a part of a factor or product market. Customers provide

financial and other resources to the firm. Each non-customer stakeholder supplies an

important factor of production to the firm in exchange for a combination of tangible and
intangible goods. For instance, an employee offers her skills, knowledge and labor in

exchange for a mix of financial (i.e., salary, benefits) and non-financial (i.e., affiliation-based
esteem, influence in decision making) goods. The same sort of logic applies to other
stakeholders as well.

A firm that provides a package that stakeholders perceive is better than what they

could get from a different firm is in a strong position to unlock positive reciprocity and the
other benefits discussed previously, including obtaining strategic intelligence, new

opportunities, loyalty, efficient transactions, and others. Google seems to have mastered

the ability to attract many of the most highly skilled and talented employees in an industry
in which there is fierce competition for human capital. They offer all the normal benefits
one would expect from a big company, such as health insurance, life insurance and

retirement benefits. However, Google considers these benefits only the beginning (Google,

2012). The company has established a goal to make employees’ lives better and easier, with
on-site physicians and nurses, emergency travel assistance, special benefits for parents,
reimbursement for education, and free legal advice. It is easy to see that many of these
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benefits, in addition to making the firm more attractive to potential employees, also help
make employees more productive.

To enjoy an efficient ratio of value created to value allocated to stakeholders, the

firm need only exceed the package a stakeholder could get elsewhere in its factor or

product market. In the case of Google, it takes a lot to surpass what direct competitors

offer, but in many other situations this is not the case. Also, while industry norms provide a
useful benchmark in determining what is a noticeable difference, managers more typically
determine this through discourse with their stakeholders, because many stakeholders are

able to jump from one industry to another. A salesperson can get firsthand information on

what appeals to customers and the value propositions offered to them by competing firms.
Similarly, buyers can gain this sort of information from interactions with suppliers.

In terms of decision-making processes, a firm cannot logically afford to open every

decision to every stakeholder’s input. Instead, managers must practically distinguish which
stakeholders are most salient to include and for which decisions. Stakeholders should be
given voice in the decisions and processes that most directly affect them or if, in other
ways, they are powerful with respect to the firm (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997).

Stakeholder power is one of two very important dimensions that can help managers

determine whether their firms are in danger of under- or over-allocating value to their

stakeholders.

Determining the Potential for Under- or Over-Allocations of Value
Two well-documented forces are at work in terms of how much value is allocated to

particular stakeholders: power and strategic importance. Stakeholders that are part of the
firm’s value creation processes have economic power, which is the ability to influence the
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financial success of the firm. Some of the other factors that might give stakeholders power

include possessing valuable resources the firm needs (resource dependence), the ability to
influence the political process in its favor or against the firm (political power), strong ties
to other stakeholders that are important to the firm (network centrality), or the ability to
sway public opinion for or against the firm (opinion leadership) (Porter, 1980; Rowley,

1997). Powerful stakeholders have the capacity to reduce the ability of the firm to achieve
its value-creating objectives through withdrawing their resources or support. For the
purpose of assessing the potential for under- or over-allocating value to a given

stakeholder, we focus on their ability and propensity to hurt the firm resulting from the
power they possess.

The other force, strategic importance, pertains to the ability of a stakeholder to

contribute to making the firm more competitive. For instance, strong suppliers make auto
manufacturers like Toyota and Honda more competitive.

The principle of reciprocity suggests that firms should be especially careful to

allocate an attractive amount of value to strategically important stakeholders because
doing so is likely to provide a high return. However, reality suggests that powerful

stakeholders may be able to extract more than their fair share of value, as in the case of the
unions in the U.S. auto industry. Combining these two dimensions can help managers

identify which stakeholders might be under- or over-rewarded for what they provide to the
firm, from an efficiency perspective (see Figure 1).

[insert Figure 1 about here]

The highest priority stakeholders with regard to allocations of value (material and

decision processes) are high in both power and strategic importance. However, because
16

they are powerful they are likely to be getting attractive value packages from the firm

already. Their power could actually be resulting in over-allocations of value; however,

because they are strategically important these over-allocations may not hurt efficiency too

much. At the other end of the spectrum, low priority stakeholders, because they lack power
and strategic importance, are not likely to have too much or too little value allocated to

them. Their lack of power means that they cannot extract much additional value from the
firm and their lack of strategic importance means that additional allocations of value are
less likely to lead to the positive reciprocity that increases value created by the firm.
This situation is in contrast to stakeholders who are powerful but are not

strategically important. For these stakeholders a careful balancing act is required. The firm
will not get as much in return for additional value allocated to these stakeholders because

they are not important to competitiveness, but their ability to hurt the firm means that they
should not be neglected. Special interest groups with a lot of political clout, such as the

Sierra Club and the National Rifle Association, frequently fall into this category. So also do
suppliers of scarce materials that are essential to a firm but do not help the firm

differentiate its products. For example, very little high quality sand is available for use by
the cement industry in many locations of the world. Although high quality sand is

necessary to produce cement, all cement producers use it, so it cannot serve to differentiate
the product. However, if a sand supplier feels under-rewarded and stops supplying a

particular cement manufacturer with what they need, it could lead to serious problems for
the manufacturer.

Stakeholders with low power and high strategic importance are the most likely to

have value under-allocated to them because their lack of power means that they are not as
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salient to managers. Essentially, they are not as “loud” in the planning process. Vendors in

competitive markets are likely to fall into this category. Although they may not have a lot of
market power or political clout, they can be central to achieving strategies that include

differentiating products and services or targeting particular markets. Both vendors and
buyers in competitive markets likely possess valuable intelligence that is useful for

directing the strategies and activities of the firms with which they do business. It is these
types of stakeholders that managers might want to pay special attention to in their

planning processes because of the potential to unlock the forces from reciprocity if they are
not already receiving a package of value that is perceived as better than what they might
receive through transactions with other firms.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND BUSINESS SCHOLARS

This article has implications for both the practice of management and for

management scholars. For managers, we have addressed the issue of how to align the

interests of stakeholders such that they will contribute more to value creating processes
while not jeopardizing the productive efficiency of the enterprise. Specifically, we have

provided guidance that may be useful in determining which stakeholders are most likely to
receive under- or over-allocations of value relative to their importance to the firm and the
value they help to create.

As stakeholders perceive that they are getting a better value proposition from the

firm than they would get elsewhere, reciprocity can result in the creation of additional

value. These stakeholders are more likely to share important information with the firm.

The ability of the firm to attract stakeholders means that new opportunities are presented

and sales may increase. Other results may include more efficient transactions, loyalty, and
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fewer negative stakeholder actions such as legal suits or boycotts. However, some

stakeholders are more important than others. Specifically, powerful stakeholders have a
greater ability to extract additional value from the firm, and strategically important

stakeholders hold the greatest potential for gains through reciprocity. Combining these two
dimensions results in suggestions with regard to determining which stakeholders are more
or less likely to receive over- or under-allocations of value from the firm, in terms of

efficiency.

For scholars, the contribution this paper makes is to clarify a practical boundary of

stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory is not about “giving away the store”… it is about

optimizing the performance of a group, where performance can be defined in terms of total
value created. This paper provides a needed refinement of the boundary of stakeholder
theory’s predictions. It is not strictly true that firms that provide more value to

stakeholders outperform other firms. A firm can provide too much value to one or more of

its stakeholders, as demonstrated in the cases of Malden Mills, Fannie Mae, General Motors
and Total SA. Also, the concept of a just noticeable difference provides an interesting
empirical question for researchers. In particular, are firms that treat each of their

stakeholders just a little better than they are treated by other firms in an optimal position
to create value, or should firms focus on one or two stakeholder groups?

To some extent, our paper is oversimplified in that there are ongoing assumptions

that stakeholders can be managed and that they do not have hostile ulterior motives.

Future research might address what happens to the value allocated to stakeholders that are
hard to manage or are hostile and expect an unfair allocation of value from the firm.

Another potentially profitable research area that is linked to the ideas contained in this
19

article is performance measurement. Value can be created across an entire resource

coordination system. Consequently, existing measures of firm performance, which are
largely financial, are not adequate to capture the total value created in such a system.

Future research could include case studies as well as survey and archival studies.

Case studies could include companies that are managing for stakeholders while not giving
away the store, companies that seem to be allocating too much value to particular

stakeholders, and firms that are not allocating enough value, in its multiple forms, to
stakeholders. The theory presented herein also lends itself to a large-sample test to

determine if firms that fall into these categories have differential financial performance.

Research of this type offers the potential to advance stakeholder theory and better explain
longer-term firm performance.
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TABLE 1
Possible Examples of Over-allocating Value to Stakeholders
Company
General
Motors

Fannie
Mae

Total SA

Too much value distributed to:
Employees—due to a very strong
union the company had wages
and benefits packages that made
its automobiles a poor value
proposition (price relative to
quality) in comparison with rivals,
and most notably foreign rivals
such as Toyota and Honda.
Shareholders and Mortgage
Companies—the company
continuously lowered its
underwriting standards for
mortgages in an effort to keep its
mortgage pipeline growing to
please private shareholders.
Local Communities – the company
has shown a pattern of bending to
controversial local community
practices to both secure and sell
oil such as bribery in Iraq and
Italy and defying economic
sanctions in transactions with
Iran and Myanmar.

Diminished value available to:
Customers and Financial Capital
Providers—both were big losers, as
demand dropped off and the
company was no longer able to
provide a fair return to its
shareholders and eventually was
unable to cover its financial
obligations to creditors.
Mortgage Holders—many home
buyers, especially those with
adjustable rate mortgages, ended up
buying homes they could not afford,
ending in a record number of
foreclosures. Foreclosures were both
caused by and an indirect cause of
the weakening economy.
Employees and Suppliers—
stakeholders at home in France and
in 130 other countries who feel
misled by the company’s promise to
“forge fair, sustainable, trust-based
relationships with [stakeholders].”
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Performance problems
Financial performance was poor for
so long that eventually the U.S.
government had to step in to bail out
the company.
Concern that the company would
become insolvent led the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to
place the company into
conservatorship. The CEO and board
of directors were dismissed, and
dividends on outstanding stock were
suspended.
The company incurs greater costs
due to extra scrutiny by legal
authorities in France and the EU. It
also incurs the marginal costs of
attracting new stakeholders who
have alternative opportunities with
firms that enjoy better values-based
reputations.

TABLE 2
Boundaries on Value Allocations to Stakeholders
Description

Lower Bound
Upper Bound

Optimal Level

Material or Financial Value
Stakeholders perceive that their distribution of
material or pecuniary compensation is fair
relative to other stakeholders

Material value stakeholders would receive in their
next best alternative relationship with a firm
(opportunity cost)
Not enough material value to adequately
compensate other stakeholders or insufficient
resources to sustain healthy operations over the
long term; marginal unit of value given to
stakeholder is less than the unit of value
reciprocated back to firm over several cycles
A just noticeable difference; stakeholders perceive
that the value they receive is better than what
they would receive elsewhere by just enough to
make a difference to them
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Decision-Making Processes
Fairness of firm’s decision making processes;
transparency, solicitation of ideas, excellent
communications, and use of input to decisions,
flexibility
Level of input and consideration that would be
received by the stakeholder in similar situations with
other firms (opportunity cost)
Decision process too complex to manage; inefficiency
threatens productivity; possibly too many
stakeholders involved in processes
Constructive input to processes and decisions
solicited from primary stakeholders without giving
too much priority to any particular stakeholders;
stakeholders consider process fair
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